Rob Bloomfield sent me an interesting article in the Washington Post, Friday March 27th.  It describes a dispute between the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) and Freddie Mac’s executives over the extent of its disclosures in it’s annual 10-k.  As a company that continues to be publicly traded on the NYSE, executives felt compelled to comply with SEC regulations to disclose the impacts of the government’s management of the company on its profitability.  However, the FHFA reportedly did not want such disclosures to be made in the interest of its broader public policy goals.

This situation is one of the likely many unforeseen consequences of the unusual government-private arrangements that have arisen through the U.S. response to the financial crisis.  It raises interesting questions about the potential impacts on capital suppliers of formerly wholly-private entities when the government and/or regulators participate in managing such companies. 

Are there other similar impacts for other companies who have received bailout money, TARP money, government loans, or other government involvement?  What are the impacts on valuations, price volatility, earnings forecasts, and other market variables of similar arrangements?